A-MAP Skill#

A-MAP (Agent Mandate Protocol) gives AI agents cryptographic proof of what they are authorized to do — and lets services verify that proof before acting.

Install#

text

npm install @agentmandateprotocol/core

---

Part 1: Verify — Authenticate an Incoming Agent Request#

Use this when another agent sends you a request and you need to confirm it was authorized by a human before acting on it.

When to verify#

• A request includes X-AMAP-Mandate, X-AMAP-Signature, X-AMAP-Timestamp, X-AMAP-Nonce, or X-AMAP-Agent-DID headers
• You need to detect agent impersonation or replay attacks
• You need cryptographic proof of who authorized this agent to act

What you need#

• The five A-MAP headers from the incoming request
• The expected permission the caller claims to have
• The public keys of all agents in the chain (distribute out-of-band)

How to verify#

javascript

import { amap, InMemoryNonceStore, LocalKeyResolver } from '@agentmandateprotocol/core'

const keyResolver = new LocalKeyResolver(new Map([
  ['did:amap:sender-agent:1.0:abc', process.env.SENDER_PUBKEY],
]))

// Use Redis or Cloudflare KV in production — see Guardrails
const nonceStore = new InMemoryNonceStore()

try {
  const result = await amap.verifyRequest({
    headers: {
      'X-AMAP-Agent-DID': request.headers['x-amap-agent-did'],
      'X-AMAP-Mandate':   request.headers['x-amap-mandate'],
      'X-AMAP-Signature': request.headers['x-amap-signature'],
      'X-AMAP-Timestamp': request.headers['x-amap-timestamp'],
      'X-AMAP-Nonce':     request.headers['x-amap-nonce'],
    },
    method: request.method,
    path:   request.path,
    body:   request.body,
    expectedPermission: 'book_flight',
    keyResolver,
    nonceStore,
  })

  // Safe to proceed
  console.log('Authorized by:', result.principal)
  console.log('Effective limits:', result.effectiveConstraints)
  console.log('Audit ID:', result.auditId)  // always log this
} catch (err) {
  // A-MAP throws on any failure — never returns { valid: false }
  console.error(`Authorization failed: [${err.code}] ${err.message}`)
  // Reject the request
}

Interpreting the result#

On success (no error thrown):

• result.principal — the human who originally authorized this chain
• result.effectiveConstraints — merged limits across all hops (e.g. maxSpend: 347)
• result.chain — array of verified links, one per hop
• result.auditId — UUID for this verification event — log it for audit trail

On failure ( AmapError thrown):

• err.code — specific error code (see references/error-codes.md)
• err.hop — which link in the chain failed (0 = root), if applicable

Verify guardrails#

• Never proceed with an action if verifyRequest() throws
• Always log result.auditId for audit trail
• The default InMemoryNonceStore does not work behind a load balancer — use a shared store (Redis, Cloudflare KV) in multi-instance deployments
• Always check result.effectiveConstraints before consequential actions (e.g. check maxSpend before charging a card)
• An AmapError means the agent was not authorized, the request is a replay, the chain was forged, or the identity is being spoofed — always reject

---

Part 2: Sign — Authenticate an Outgoing Request#

Use this before calling any A-MAP-protected service to attach cryptographic proof that a human authorized your action.

When to sign#

• You are calling a service that uses A-MAP to verify agents
• You need to prove a human authorized your action
• You are forwarding a delegation chain to a downstream service

Prerequisites#

• A mandate chain (from amap.issue() or amap.delegate())
• Your agent's Ed25519 private key in AMAP_PRIVATE_KEY

How to sign#

javascript

import { amap } from '@agentmandateprotocol/core'

const headers = amap.signRequest({
  mandateChain: myMandateChain,
  method:       'POST',
  path:         '/api/book-flight',
  body:         JSON.stringify(requestBody),  // omit if no body
  privateKey:   process.env.AMAP_PRIVATE_KEY,
})

await fetch('https://api.example.com/book-flight', {
  method:  'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', ...headers },
  body:    JSON.stringify(requestBody),
})

amap.signRequest() returns five headers ready to spread:

HeaderContentX-AMAP-Agent-DIDDID of the signing agentX-AMAP-MandateBase64url-encoded DelegationToken chainX-AMAP-SignatureEd25519 signature over canonical payloadX-AMAP-TimestampISO8601 UTC timestampX-AMAP-Nonce128-bit random hex string (single-use)

See references/signed-request-format.md for the full payload schema.

Sign guardrails#

• Never hardcode AMAP_PRIVATE_KEY — always use an environment variable
• Never log the private key
• A fresh nonce is generated on every signRequest() call — never reuse headers
• Check mandate expiry before signing — an expired mandate produces headers the receiver will reject with TOKEN_EXPIRED

---

Part 3: Delegate — Authorize a Sub-Agent#

Use this when spawning a sub-agent that needs its own cryptographic proof of authorization to call external services on your behalf.

When to delegate#

• You are spawning a sub-agent to handle part of a task
• A sub-agent needs to call A-MAP-protected services directly
• You want to limit what the sub-agent can do to a safe subset of your permissions

How to delegate#

javascript

import { amap } from '@agentmandateprotocol/core'

// myToken = DelegationToken you received; myChain = full chain including myToken
let childToken
try {
  childToken = await amap.delegate({
    parentToken: myToken,
    parentChain: myChain,
    delegate:    'did:amap:sub-agent:1.0:xyz',
    permissions: ['charge_card'],     // must be subset of myToken.permissions
    constraints: { maxSpend: 347 },   // can only tighten, never relax
    expiresIn:   '15m',               // cannot exceed parent's remaining TTL
    privateKey:  process.env.AMAP_PRIVATE_KEY,
  })
} catch (err) {
  // AmapError thrown BEFORE signing if an invariant is violated:
  //   PERMISSION_INFLATION  — permissions not in parent
  //   CONSTRAINT_RELAXATION — constraint looser than parent
  //   EXPIRY_VIOLATION      — TTL exceeds parent's remaining time
  throw err
}

// Pass the full chain to the sub-agent — not just the child token
const subAgentChain = [...myChain, childToken]

The sub-agent uses amap.signRequest({ mandateChain: subAgentChain, ... }) to attach this chain to its outgoing requests.

Expiry strategy#

Task typeRecommended TTLSingle API call15sOne-off task60sShort workflow5mExtended sessionMatch parent — SDK enforces the ceiling

The three rules (enforced by SDK — see references/delegation-invariants.md)#

1. Permissions can only narrow — you cannot grant what you do not have
2. Constraints can only tighten — you cannot relax a limit set above you
3. Expiry can only shorten — sub-agent tokens expire before yours

Delegate guardrails#

• Always pass subAgentChain (full chain), not just the new token
• Set the shortest possible expiresIn for sub-agents
• Log childToken.tokenId for audit trail
• Never share your AMAP_PRIVATE_KEY — each agent has its own keypair